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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Plaintiffs and Appellants (hereinafter "Appellants") Statement 
of Jurisdiction notes their appeal is from a partial summary 
judgment dated December 10, 1996, in favor of the individual 
Defendants, a judgment entered on or about May 13, 1997, in favor 
of the Corporate Defendant, and a ruling on the Appellants' 60(b) 
Motion to Set Aside entered October 10, 1997. This is at odds with 
the Notice of Appeal which states that the Appellants, "appeal to 
the Utah Supreme Court the final order and judgment of the 
Honorable Anthony Schofield entered in this matter on November 10, 
1997." 
An appeal of the partial summary judgment entered December 10, 
1996, and of the Judgment entered on or about May 13, 1997, is not 
timely and, accordingly, this Court has no jurisdiction. An appeal 
of the ruling entered October 10, 1997, is an appeal of an Order 
which is not final and, accordingly, the Appellate Courts have no 
jurisdiction. (See Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure). This is not a discretionary appeal pursuant to Rule 
5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure because there has been 
no petition for permission to appeal as required by Rule 5(a) of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Accordingly, for those 
reasons this appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 
Nevertheless, the individual Defendants will address the issues 
raised by the Appellants in this matter. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review in this matter is abuse of discretion. 
The Utah Supreme Court has found in Gardiner and Gardiner Builders 
v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 429 at page 430: 
"The trial court has considerable discretion in 
ruling on a motion to set aside a default judgment 
under Rule 60(b) and this Court will reverse the 
trial court only where a clear abuse of discretion 
is shown." 
As to a standard of review relative to a summary judgment 
granted by the trial court, the individual Defendants adopt the 
standard of review set forth in the Corporate Defendants' brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The individual Defendants adopt the statement of the case as 
set forth in the Corporate Defendants' Brief. 
ARGUMENT I 
The partial summary judgment entered December 10, 1996, in 
this matter should not be set aside. Plaintiffs' Rule 60(b)(7) 
Motion to Set Aside Partial Summary Judgment and Request for a 
Hearing and Plaintiffs' Response to Plaintiff's Rule 54(B) Motion 
was filed with the trial court on July 23, 1997. The matter was 
argued before the trial court on September 4, 1997. On November 
10, 1997, the trial court entered its "Order Denying Plaintiff's 
Motion to Set Aside Partial Summary Judgment; and, Judgment Order 
Granting Certification under Rule 54(b)." 
By way of history, on November 6, 1996, the individual 
Defendants served their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
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together with an accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
and Affidavit on the Plaintiffs by hand-delivering a copy of it to 
Plaintiffs' counsel, Mark K. Stringer. On November 19, 1996, 
individual Defendants mailed a Notice of Submission for Decision 
regarding their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to counsel for 
the Plaintiffs and counsel for the Corporate Defendants. 
Thereafter, on December 10, 1996, the Court entered the Partial 
Summary Judgment, signing the proposed form of which had been 
served upon the Plaintiffs by hand-delivering a copy of it to their 
counsel on November 19, 1996. 
In the Appellants' Motion, the Appellants claim that the 
Partial Summary Judgment should be set aside because Plaintiffs' 
counsel, Mark Stringer, failed to respond to the Motion for Summary 
Judgment which gave rise to the Partial Summary Judgment and failed 
to inform the Plaintiffs of that motion. Mr. Stringer's neglect 
is imputed to the Appellants through principles of agency. In 
Walker v. Carlson, 740 P.2d 1372 (Ut. App. 1997) the Court found: 
"If counsel failed to inform Smith of the pendency 
of the action or was less than diligent in the 
discovery process, such neglect on the attorney's 
part is imputed to Smith through principles of 
agency." 
The Appellants in this matter claim that, "the actions of Mark 
K. Stringer go well beyond excusable neglect, mistake, surprise or 
inadvertence" as outlined under Rule 60(b)(1). (See Appellants' 
Brief, page 12). Such an argument does not provide relief to the 
Appellants under Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
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Procedure. As is stated by the Gardiner court: 
"We have previously held that the provisions of 
Rule 60(b) (7) may not be used to circumvent the 
time limitation of Rule 60(b)(1)." Pitts v. 
McLachlan, Utah, 567 P.2d 171 (1997). Swapp's 
contention that his motion was brought on grounds 
other than negligence is without merit." 
That position is further bolstered by the Utah Court of 
Appeals in Lincoln Ben. Life v. D.T. Southern Prop., 838 P.2d 672 
(Ut. App. 1992) where the Court states that page 674: 
"As the residuary clause of Rule 60(b), subsection 
(7), embodies three requirements for relief: 
*first, that the reason be one other than those 
listed in subdivisions (1) through (6); second, 
that the reason justify relief; and third, that the 
motion be made within a reasonable time." Laub v. 
South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1304, 1306-07 
(Ut. 1982). Subsection (7) ^should be very 
cautiously and sparingly invoked by the Court only 
in unusual and exceptional instances.' Id. at 1307-
08 (quoting Hughs v. Sanders, 287 F.Supp. 332, 334 
(E. D.Okla.1968)). Furthermore, subsection (7) may 
not be employed for relief when the grounds 
asserted are encompassed within subsection (1)-" 
(Further citations deleted). 
ARGUMENT II 
Plaintiffs' pleadings do not set forth facts on the record to 
avoid summary judgment. 
The individual Appellants incorporate the corporate 
Defendants' position in this matter. 
The Appellants argue that the Plaintiffs' Complaint, with 
other pleadings on file, contain a sufficient meritorious defense 
to the counterclaims of the Appellee's in this matter. That is not 
the case. These pleadings are not verified. The affidavits which 
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were properly before the trial court on September 4, 1997, allege 
no specific facts in opposition to either the individual 
Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment or the Corporate 
Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. In order for the 
Appellants to be relieved from either the Partial Summary Judgment 
or the Judgment which were entered in this matter, they must show 
that the judgments were entered against them through a reason 
specified in Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that 
the motion to set aside the judgment was timely, and that they had 
a meritorious defense to this action. (State by and through D. of 
S.S. v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 (Ut. 1983)). There being no facts 
on the record before the trial court at the time of the hearing on 
September 4, 1997, which would support any of the Appellants' 
contentions adverse to the respective Appellee's Motions for 
Summary Judgment, there was not even an effort to show that they 
had a meritorious defense. 
ARGUMENT III 
The individual Defendants incorporate and adopt the Corporate 
Defendants' Brief in this matter. 
ARGUMENT IV 
The District Court's conclusions were correct. 
The trial court in this matter concluded that the individual 
Appellee's Partial Summary Judgment was entered in December of 1996 
and that the Plaintiffs did not file a Motion to set aside that 
Partial Summary Judgment until July of 1997, some 7 H months later. 
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The trial court further found that the affidavits of the Appellants 
which were filed with the Court on the date of the hearing, 
September 4, 1991, were not timely and, accordingly, the trial 
court found that, as to the individual Appellees, the Plaintiffs' 
Rule 60(b) Motion was not timely and that the Plaintiffs failed to 
demonstrate a meritorious defense. 
ARGUMENT V 
The trial court did not error in its decision and it did allow 
the new attorney for the Appellants to present arguments and be 
heard before the Court. The transcript (exhibit Y to the 
Appellants' Brief) of the September 4, 1997, hearing consists of 
28 pages. 
The Appellants' counsel at the September 4, 1997, hearing was 
Mr. Schollian. Mr. Schollian disposes of the Appellants' objection 
to the Rule 54 (b) Motion starting at line 24 of page 6 and going 
over to line 2 of page 7 of the transcript where he admits that the 
only reason the Partial Summary Judgment and Judgment should not 
be certified under Rule 54(b) as final judgments is because he 
believes that the Court should grant the Appellants' Rule 54(b) 
Motion. The trial court then goes on to invite Mr. Schollian to 
make his Rule 60(b) arguments. Mr. Schollian starts his Rule 
60(b) (7) arguments on line 8, page 8 of the transcript and 
continues to and through line 11, page 12 of the transcript at 
vhich time he asks the Court: 
"Would you like me to go into Rule 60(b) Motion, your Honor?". 
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Mr. Schollian then argues his Rule 60(b) Motion as applies to 
the Judgment obtained by the Corporate Appellees starting on line 
15, page 12 of the transcript and going through line 20 of page 6 
of the transcript. Then he relinquishes his time to counsel for 
the individual Appellees. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellants' appeal should be denied for the following 
reasons: 
1) In the Appellants' Statement of Jurisdiction, it is clear 
that the three things appealed are the Partial Summary Judgment 
entered December 10, 1996, the Judgment entered on or about May 13, 
1997, and a Ruling entered on October 10, 1997. The Notice of 
Appeal claims an appeal to the Utah Supreme Court of the final 
order and judgment of the Honorable Anthony Schofield entered on 
November 10, 1997. Accordingly, the Appellants do not brief the 
matter appealed. Furthermore, an appeal started by a Notice of 
Appeal filed on November 25, 1997, regarding a Ruling dated October 
10, 1997, is not timely. 
2) The Partial Summary Judgment in favor of the individual 
Appellees in this matter was entered on December 10, 1996. The 
Appellants' motion to set aside that Partial Summary Judgment was 
not filed until July 23, 1997, a period of some 7 H months. In 
that motion, the Appellants claim that the Partial Summary Judgment 
should be set aside "on the grounds that said judgment was entered 
as a result of the inadvertence, mistake, excusable neglect and 
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incompetence of counsel and on the grounds that it would be in the 
furtherance of justice to try this matter on the merits." (See 
page 1, Exhibit S to Appellants' Brief). Such a motion must be 
filed within three months of the entry of judgment. 
3) The Partial Summary Judgment ordered among other things 
at the Lis Pendens filed with the Utah County Recorder, Utah 
County, State of Utah, on behalf of the Appellants and encumbering 
the real property which is the subject matter of this dispute, be 
released. It has been released and various parties have relied 
upon it, thus making that release the law of the case. 
4) Subsection 7 of Rule 60(b) may not be employed for relief 
when the grounds asserted are encompassed within subsection (1). 
Respectfully submitted this 22nd day of September, 1998. 
ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER, LC 
^ 
THOMAS W. SEILER 
Attorney for Defendants and Appellees 
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